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Russian and foreign hydraulic experts in Central Asia, 1887‑1917
L’Empire et l’ingénierie hydraulique : les experts russes et étrangers en Asie
centrale, 1887-1917
Maya K. Peterson
1 In 1912 Russian Minister of Agriculture Alexander Krivoshein proposed a pithy formula
which encapsulated his hopes for the future development of the imperial province of
Turkestan, the southernmost part of the Russian Empire. Cotton plus colonization plus
irrigation would create, in Krivoshein’s words, 
[…] an area equivalent to the amount of land currently irrigated in Turkestan, as it
were  creating a  second Turkestan.  This  new Turkestan,  not  inferior  to  the  old,
native one in magnitude, would surpass it in riches and level of culture, and its new
population would be Russian.1 
2 Krivoshein’s formula was an articulation of official and unofficial processes that were
already underway in Turkestan:  privately‑  and publicly‑financed investigations of the
possibility for expanding the production of cotton in the region, as well as the legal and
illegal movement to the province of thousands of Russian peasant colonists from the
overcrowded  regions  of  central  Russia.  Krivoshein  hoped  that  through  greater
government regulation and investment, these processes would transform Turkestan from
an arid and underpopulated military colony in Asia into a prosperous and fertile corner of
the modernizing Russian Empire.
3 Krivoshein  was  not  alone.  By  the  second  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  Russian
officials,  along  with  businessmen,  engineers  and  agronomists  concerned  with  the
development of Russia’s “Asiatic” borderlands, had increasingly come to agree that “the
whole life,  wealth, and future of Turkestan” depended on irrigation.2 The question of
financing and undertaking new irrigation projects  in Turkestan arose in meetings of
engineers and agronomists, as well as in advisory councils from the level of the province
up to the State Duma. Since most agricultural  products could not grow in Turkestan
without irrigation, successful irrigation projects would be necessary to ensure both the
expansion of Turkestan’s arable acreage, as well as the viability of Russian agricultural
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settlements in the region. By promoting the cultivation of cash crops such as cotton,
irrigation would make Turkestan an indispensable, economically integrated part of the
Empire, and by opening up new areas for peasant settlement, irrigation would help to
mark this territory as indelibly Russian. That this agricultural transformation was highly
desirable was clear, yet the irrigation of Russian Turkestan posed myriad challenges.
4 Agriculture in arid regions requires particular kinds of knowledge. Over centuries Central
Asians had developed sophisticated systems for the cultivation of crops in an arid climate,
yet many Russian and foreign observers considered indigenous agricultural methods to
be unsatisfactory; they instead called for more “correct” and “rational” usage of land and
water resources in Turkestan through the introduction of the latest scientific knowledge
and technology.3 In order to display the superiority of imported methods of resource
management,  however,  and  translate  visions  of  newly  “cultured”  lands  into  reality,
practical skills were required. A significant component of the political success of Russia’s
imperial project in Turkestan was thus seen to depend upon scientific experts who could
help realize Russian ambitions in the region. In the following pages I examine figures
involved in the irrigation of Russian Turkestan in an effort to uncover both the important
roles that hydraulic engineering experts played in Russian schemes for Central Asian
development, as well as the roles that such schemes played in Russia’s ongoing quest in
the early twentieth century to define itself to the world as a modern and thoroughly
European empire.4 
5 By  participating  in—and  even  initiating—campaigns  to  bring  the  latest  advances  in
engineering  practices  and  technology  to  the  Central  Asian  borderlands,  hydraulic
engineers in Turkestan were at once agents of empire, representatives of the center in
the periphery whose goal was to transform remote spaces on the map into places that
were  recognizably  Russian,  while  also  acting  as  propagandists  for  empire,  aiming to
convince the indigenous population in the borderlands of the benefits of Russian rule and
demonstrate to the world that the Russian Empire should take its place among the ranks
of European empires.  These were men who saw themselves as giving the “the gift of
empire”—in the case of hydraulic engineers in Turkestan, the gift of engineering science
and technologies for modern irrigated agriculture—even while the imperial projects they
undertook  deprived  indigenous  peoples  of  lands  and  livelihoods,  and  set  in  motion
processes that in the second half of the twentieth century would subjugate Central Asians
to reliance on a cotton monoculture.5 They also transcended empire, as they engaged
with an international  network of  professional  engineers  and experts,  harnessing the
resources of  that network to exploit  the resources of  Russia to the maximum extent
possible. In spite of their zeal, however, and in spite of the calls of Russian technocrats for
irrigation expertise in the development of Turkestan, inherent tensions between the dual
goals of irrigation—cotton and colonization—which stemmed from the uncertain position
of  the tsarist  government when it  came to intervening in land and water resources,
hindered the imperial mission of reclaiming the Central Asian borderlands. By the time
the government began to make a concerted effort to rectify this situation, it was already
too late.
 
The question of expansion
6 According to Alfred Rieber, in the second half of the nineteenth century the Russian state
“was forced to acknowledge […] that a strong engineering profession with its own ethos
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was a vital necessity for the maintenance of Russia’s great power status.”6 In the wake of
the Great Reforms of the 1860s a mobile group of engineers from increasingly diverse
social backgrounds began consistently to exert power at the highest levels of Russian
government.7 This growth in political influence coincided with the growth of a newfound
professional  identity,  giving  these  Russian  engineers  a  particular  sense  of  imperial
purpose, alongside a zeal for pushing the boundaries of science and technology.8 In the
1890s, Finance Minister Sergei Witte’s push for the rapid industrialization of the Russian
Empire promoted a growing group of “technocrats” in the Russian administration, who
began to call for the identification and exploitation of all of the “productive forces” of the
empire.9 Such calls created new opportunities for engineers and other specialists to help
reshape the lands of the empire.10
7 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, young Russian engineers, trained for
imperial careers and assignments in strategic places on the periphery, were confident in
the ability of their knowledge and expertise to transform the most intractable spaces of
the Empire. Because their expertise accorded with the power ambitions of the Russian
state,  their  confidence  came  not  only  from  an  unshakable  faith  in  the  power  of
“European”  science—as  opposed  to  local  or  “native”  knowledge—but  also  from  a
self‑image as professionals whose expertise was vital to the processes of empire.11 In a
newly  conquered  region  such  as  Turkestan,  engineers  could  play  a  crucial  role  in
strengthening Russian control and a sense of legitimacy.
8 Intertwined with the notion of service to the Empire and its subjects was the notion that
Russian  engineering  achievements  were  taking  place  on  a  world  stage.  After  the
humiliating military defeat by Japan in 1905 and the resulting unrest on the domestic
front, Russians were particularly keen to prove their ability to keep up with European
powers. The province of Turkestan, incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1867 as a
governor‑generalship under military rule, provided a space where such abilities might be
demonstrated.  By  1884,  the  last  hostile  Turkmen  nomads  had  been  subjugated—or
massacred—and the Russian Empire ruled over a vast new territory, much of which was
desert.  In transforming those deserts over the course of subsequent decades,  Russian
hydraulic engineers in Central  Asia might join the ranks of the some of the greatest
hydraulic engineers of the time: the architects of the Suez and Panama Canals, the Aswan
Low Dam, the Los Angeles‑Owens River aqueduct in California, and the irrigators of the
Punjab  in  northwest  India.  Certainly  any  progress  Russian  engineers  made  in  their
Central Asian borderlands would be studied by engineers and governments the world
over with interest. 
9 The tsarist  government  initially  appeared to  support  such ambitions.  Soon after  the
surrender of the Merv oasis on the southern edge of the Qara Qum Desert near the border
with  Afghanistan,  an  imperial  ukase  of  Alexander III  in  August  1887  proclaimed  the
founding of the Imperial Murghab Estate.12 According to this decree, all “empty” [vpuste
lezhashchiia] lands suitable for irrigation and cultivation that could be irrigated without
doing harm to irrigated territory nearby were now the property of the tsar.13 The estate,
situated on the right bank of the Murghab River along the newly constructed Central
Asian (Trans‑Caspian)  Railway line,  was  to  serve as  a  model  plantation which would
produce new varieties of crops—cotton in particular, but also various types of fruit—while
simultaneously helping to mechanize and modernize “native” agriculture in the region.14
Though  Russian  officials  had  little  knowledge  of  which  lands  might  be  suitable  for
irrigation and cultivation—or, indeed, which lands were “empty”—and though there was
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little government capital to invest in such projects and few men qualified to undertake
them, under the direction of a civil engineer named Jan J. Poklewski‑Koziell construction
on a dam went ahead in 1888,  on the spot where for centuries a dam known as the
Sultan‑Bent had already stood.15 
10 Through the use of  locally made bricks and hydraulic lime mortar,  Poklewski‑Koziell
hoped to build a dam that was stronger than the previous earthen constructions.16 The
first attempt at a new dam, however, ruptured before construction was completed.17 In
part because of this initial failure, the dam’s construction costs were ultimately more
than twice as high as original estimates.18 The Russian government’s decision to import a
British engineer to finish the task also contributed to the expenses. In September 1889,
state  councilor  Stanislav  Rauner  visited  British  irrigation  engineer  Sir  Colin
Scott‑Moncrieff in person in Egypt to invite him to come to Russia for two months and
advise the Russians on the irrigation of the Murghab Estate. Scott‑Moncrieff, who had
spent the first part of his career in India and more recently had become head of the
Irrigation  Department  in  Egypt,  was  chosen  specifically  because  of  his  experience
building a barrage on the Nile, a site the Russians believed to be very similar to Merv.
Upon  arrival  in  Merv  one  month  later,  Scott‑Moncrieff  admired  Poklewski‑Koziell’s
ingenuity and was impressed by the work, but he also noted that Poklewski seemed to
know nothing about irrigation—though he clearly thought he did—and that the Estate, in
general, was “a vile place.”19 
11 The fact that Poklewski‑Koziell, an engineer whose primary experience was working on
railroads,  and  a  man  who  apparently  had  been  exiled for  participation  in  the  1863
anti‑tsarist  Polish  Uprising,  was  put  in  charge  of  the  most  important  imperial
construction project in this sensitive border region, only newly incorporated into the
empire,  tells  us  something  about  the state  of  engineering  in  general—and hydraulic
engineering  in  particular—in  the  Russian  Empire  in  the  late  nineteenth  century.20
Whereas waterways had originally been the major arteries of transport in the Russian
Empire, by the late nineteenth century a railroad boom had shifted the focus of civil and
military  engineers  away  from  waterways  toward  railways.  Government  committees
assigned  to  consider  the  question  of  water  usage  in  Turkestan  would  suggest  that
“improving the means of water usage has no less importance for Turkestan than the
creation of new railroads,” yet there were far fewer specialists who could attend to the
former task than the latter.21 Engineers like Poklewski‑Koziell were trained in technical
institutes—primarily  the  St. Petersburg  Institute  of  the  Corps  of  Transport  Engineers
[Engineers of Ways of Communications]—that covered all  aspects of civil  engineering,
without  encouraging  specialization.  Hydraulic  engineering  remained  focused  on  the
theoretical and made up only a small part of the overall engineering curriculum.22
12 Yet the Murghab Estate also revealed the limitations of the Russian state presence in
Turkestan in another way. Not only was there a dearth of the kind of experts who might
help to demonstrate the superiority of a Russian way of life to the indigenous people of
Turkestan, but the 1886 statute that provided for the region’s governance by its new
rulers simply stated: “Waters in the main canals, streams, rivers, and lakes are given to
the population for use according to custom.”23 This meant that the Russian state did not
have control over one of the region’s most important resources.  In 1887, the year in
which the Murghab Estate was founded, State Councilor Nikolai Dingel´shtedt, assistant
to one of the Russian military governors in Turkestan, posed a vexing question: “[…]
[H]ow can we resolve disputes over water according to custom if the custom [itself] is not
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known?”24 Even more damningly, Russian interpretations of “native custom” understood
custom as granting land to the person who could bring water to it; unless the Russian
government could bring water to new land in Turkestan, reliance on custom threatened
to  undermine  the  very  legitimacy  of  Russian  rule  in  the  empire’s  Central  Asian
borderlands.25
13 In the case of the Murghab Estate, the tsarist government claimed the “empty” lands of
the Merv oasis to be the property of the tsar and thus subject to Russian intervention.
Such a claim was much more difficult in the most fertile regions of the province, such as
the densely‑populated Ferghana Valley, where agricultural produce grew in abundance,
watered by an extensive irrigation system built by the previous rulers of the region, the
khans of Kokand. Initially, rather than attempting to irrigate new lands in the Ferghana
region,  the  Russian government  took advantage  of  this  existing  irrigation system to
encourage agricultural  development.  As  on the Murghab Estate,  one of  the principal
crops promoted by the Russian government in the Ferghana Valley was cotton. In the
1880s strains of American cotton were introduced, in order to produce greater yields of
higher quality and longer staple cotton than the indigenous varietals already growing
there. Through the efforts of agronomists and a series of economic incentives introduced
by Witte in the 1890s, American varieties of cotton came to occupy more and more of
Turkestan’s irrigated acreage in Ferghana and beyond.26 
14 By  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  Ferghana  Valley  was  feeling  the
constraints of this intensification of American cotton cultivation without the expansion
of the arable acreage.27 Though some Russians argued that cotton production could be
increased further without the attempt to irrigate new lands, others disagreed.28 In 1907,
at its third session, the newly formed Cotton Committee of the Department of Agriculture
of the Main Administration of Land Organization and Agriculture (Russia’s ministry of
agriculture from 1905‑15;  henceforth Main Administration)  discussed the question of
importing grain from outside the region in order to convert more of Turkestan’s irrigated
acreage to cotton‑growing. Most present, however, felt that the replacement of too much
of the region’s grain with cotton was inadvisable.29 Senator Konstantin Pahlen, whom the
tsar sent to Turkestan in 1908 in order to conduct a thorough inspection of the province,
echoed these conclusions when he stated that “not one step forward” could be taken in
the increase of cotton acreage in the region without an extension of irrigation systems.30 
 
Educating engineers
15 Yet  on  the  eve  of  Pahlen’s  arrival  little  distinguished  Russian  accomplishments  in
irrigation from the state of affairs two decades earlier, when Dingel´shtedt had referred
to the state of irrigation in Turkestan and the Caucasus as “utter chaos.”31 Though in the
1890s posts were created within the provincial military administration for engineers and
technicians to oversee irrigation projects and water management in the region, these
officials  were  occupied  more  with  pushing  paper  than  with  the  actual  work  of
investigation and oversight,  nor  was  there any central  oversight  of  their  activities.32
When it came to practice, decisions about irrigation continued to be made at the level of
individual irrigation systems by ariq‑aqsaqals and mirabs, local community officials who
formed a hierarchy of water overseers which the tsarist government had appropriated
wholesale after the conquest of the region. Tsarist irrigation officials, in contrast—many
of whom, unlike the engineers employed by the Main Administration,  were not even
Engineering Empire
Cahiers du monde russe, 57/1 | 2016
5
trained as hydraulic specialists—had little knowledge of the details of water management
within  their  vast  districts.33 In  1909  the  Main  Administration’s  Resettlement
Administration, the bureau charged with overseeing colonization affairs, sent a young
law  student  named  Georgii  Gins  to  Turkestan  to  become  familiar  with  the  legal
regulations regarding the distribution of water for irrigation. To his surprise, Gins found
that although a law had been formulated in 1890 to regulate water distribution in the
Caucasus, there was still no such law in Turkestan.34
16 Krivoshein,  who became head of  the  Main Administration in  1908,  pleaded with the
tsarist Council of Ministers for more money to be allocated to the irrigation of Turkestan,
reminding  the  ministers  not  only  of  the  Russian  Empire’s  “political,  economic  and
cultural tasks in Central Asia, but the prestige of the Russian name among the Muslim
population.”35 The  successful  transformation  of  the  deserts  of  Turkestan  into  fertile
plains  could  do  wonders  for  legitimizing  Russian  rule  in  the  eyes  of  indigenous
Turkestanis.36 And  yet  besides  the  Murghab  Estate,  the  one  government‑sponsored
irrigation project, a scheme to irrigate 45,000 desiatinas37 in the so‑called Hungry Steppe
near the provincial capital at Tashkent, had progressed only slowly, mostly due to a lack
of  funding.  A  commission  of  the  Turkestan  Agricultural  Society  organized  in  1907
concluded  that  the  current  state  of  irrigation  in  Turkestan  was  dismal,  as  did  the
Congress of Hydraulic Engineers that convened in Tashkent at the end of that same year.
38 The agricultural  commission stated bluntly that  irrigation under the Central  Asian
khans had been more successful than any Russian attempts in Turkestan, a serious blow
to Russian pride. Americans, the commission claimed, had irrigated in just three to four
decades “what would take us, under the current regime, three to four thousand years.”
International observers, moreover, had determined that “Russia lies behind everyone in
[the fields of] irrigation technology and the development of irrigation systems.”39 
17 Some blamed these failings on the poor state of engineering education in the Russian
Empire. In January 1909, the St. Petersburg newspaper Novoe vremia published an article
by Vasilii  Al´bitskii,  distinguished professor at  Kharkov Technical  University,  entitled
“The Feebleness of Hydraulic Engineering Knowledge in Russia and the Basic Means By
Which to Eliminate It.” In this article, Professor Al´bitskii bemoaned the current state of
technical  instruction in  Russia  in  the  field  of  hydraulic  engineering  (though he  was
somewhat heartened by the fact that in technical institutes had in recent years increased
theoretical instruction). Such poor instruction, he argued, was “the main reason for the
paucity in Russia not only of prominent hydraulic engineers, but even of mediocre ones.”
According to Al´bitskii, Scott‑Moncrieff had been brought to Merv “to Russia’s chagrin
and embarrassment,” since the main reason for inviting him had been that “no domestic
hydraulic engineers could be found who could build a solid dam […].”40
18 Al´bitskii’s complaints had merit, but they overlooked the fact that by 1909 there did exist
a small but eager group of theoretically trained hydraulic specialists who had taken up
the challenge of realizing the Russian government’s goals in Turkestan in practice.  A
group of student apprentices, for instance, wrote from the Murghab Estate to protest Al
´bitskii’s characterization and defend Russian hydraulic engineering efforts in the region.
41 Remote Turkestan was  by no means as  desirable  a  place to  make a  career  as  the
imperial capital at Petersburg; such enthusiastic students were thus easier to attract to
the region than more experienced engineers.  Yet the challenges of Turkestan and its
appeal as a “backward,” “Asiatic” region that could, through the introduction of modern
science and engineering, be united with the European heartland of the empire, were such
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that some fine engineers ended up devoting a good portion of their lives to solving its
perceived problems and became some of the region’s most vocal  advocates.  Engineer
Fëdor Petrovich Morgunenkov, for instance, worked on various schemes to irrigate the
Caspian region, as well as the Hungry Steppe; he would continue to work in the region
after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.42 Georgii  Rizenkampf,  described by one of  his
compatriots  as  “full  of  energy”  and  “the  most  talented”  engineer  within  the  Main
Adminstration’s Department of Land Improvement, took over the management of the
government project in the Hungry Steppe in 1912; he remained its head into the early
Soviet  period.43 After  the  revolution  he  also  supervised  other  irrigation  works  in
Turkestan and briefly served as a professor in the reclamation department of Turkestan
University.44 Acting as an enthusiastic “booster” for Turkestan’s Semireche region from
1910 on, engineer Vladimir Alexandrovich Vasil´ev advocated investment in Semireche as
both a traditional “colony,” which would provide raw materials for extraction, as well as
a settler colony that demanded the input of human and financial capital.45 
19 Al´bitskii’s concern about Russian educational institutions also ignores the fact that these
hydraulic engineers were not bounded by the Russian Empire; rather, they actively kept
up with technological developments and scientific discussions in other parts of the world
through their own travels, observations, and research. With the blessing of the imperial
government,  they  not  only  circulated  throughout  the  empire,  but  made  journeys  to
various sites associated with science and technology throughout the world. It was typical,
for instance, for Russian hydraulic engineers to travel to Europe and to visit institutions
of  engineering education,  as well  as sites of  practice.  Rizenkampf made a journey to
Austria,  Germany,  Switzerland  and  Italy  when  he  was  still  a  student  studying
hydrotechnics and water systems at the Institute of the Corps of Transport Engineers.46
Vasil´ev  followed  a  similar  route  when  he  undertook  a  tour  of  Europe’s  recent
achievements  in  hydraulic  engineering  before  beginning  an  ambitious  irrigation
construction project in Turkestan’s Chu River Valley. Vasil´ev’s itinerary included visits
to the International Building Exhibition at Leipzig, a reservoir in Silesia that might serve
as a model for a planned reservoir in Turkestan,  and cement factories in France.  He
proposed observation of rectification programs on the Danube and Po Rivers, and tours of
Milan and Lombardy, to learn about how these regions utilized hydraulic power.47 
20 Russian hydraulic engineers in Turkestan, like American and Australian engineers before
them, also turned to British India, the training ground of some of the first and greatest
hydraulic engineers. In 1906, with the tsar’s approval, S.F. Ostrovskii, a recent graduate of
the Institute of the Corps of Transport Engineers, traveled to Punjab, where, with the aid
of  British engineers,  he was able to collect  valuable material  for  use on the Russian
government endeavor to irrigate the Hungry Steppe.48 Such trips abroad were expensive,
but they facilitated communications and professional ties between Russian and foreign
engineers, and no doubt helped to spark interest abroad in Russian schemes for hydraulic
construction.
21 In 1912 the Department of Land Improvement called for the collection of “all the existing
international literature” that might help to further hydraulic investigations in Turkestan
and the Caucasus.49 An investigation of Vasil´ev’s library at the Chu irrigation project
confirms  Russian  engineers’  ongoing  interest  in  keeping  up  with  developments  in
hydraulic construction and irrigation technologies worldwide. In 1917 the Chu project
library had 281 publications in English, eighty‑eight in German, sixty‑five in French, two
in Italian, and three in Swedish. Listings in the index of the library’s holdings include
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such eclectic titles as “Buckley, The Irrigation Works of India,” “Cooper, Water Power for
the Farm Country Home (Albany, 1911),” and the “Official Handbook of Panama Canal
(1915).”50 
22 Many Russian engineers also wrote their own books and articles to share their findings
and observations with an international community of engineers. These works cited the
latest  international  research.  In  a  work  on  problems  of  irrigating  the  Transcaspian
region,  for  instance,  Rizenkampf cited several  contemporary discussions of  irrigation
engineering,  including  Italian  professor  Luigi  Luiggi’s  summary  of  the  International
Congress of  Engineers held in 1915 in San Francisco,  as well  as a work on irrigation
engineering published in the same year by Ray Palmer Teele, irrigation economist at the
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture.51 One  of  Russia’s  foremost  engineers  and
agronomists in the early twentieth century, Evgenii Evgenievich Skorniakov, inscribed a
copy  of  one  of  his  works  to  Arthur  P. Davis,  head  engineer  of  the  United  States
Reclamation  Service,  most  likely  given  to  Davis  when  the  latter  visited  the  Russian
Empire in 1911.52
23 An important component of acquiring expertise is “socialization into the practices of an
expert  group.”53 When Russian engineers  made contact  with their  colleagues abroad,
whether  through  travel  or  through  the  exchange  of  research  findings,  they  were
conscious of doing so both on a personal and professional level that would benefit their
individual careers as sought‑after experts,  as well  as on the level of state service,  by
making  use  of  an  international  network  whose  expertise  could  benefit  the  Russian
Empire. Yet in spite of the fact that Russian engineers felt they had universal knowledge
that could be applied everywhere, had careers that took them throughout the empire and
the world, and saw themselves as professional men on par with their colleagues around
the globe, they did also manage to develop local expertise and attachments. Learning the
art of irrigation engineering on the fly required intensive and intimate study of local
physical environments and an understanding of conditions that were quite foreign from
those in St. Petersburg. 
24 Though the theoretical training they received in the technical institutes was intended to
give engineers the kind of universal knowledge that could be applied anywhere in the
empire, Russian hydraulic specialists in Turkestan faced the problem that different parts
of  the  vast  Russian  Empire  were  by  no  means  alike.  Russian  irrigators,  like  their
counterparts in other parts of the world, believed themselves to be “master technicians
whose work realized the inherent potential or purpose of the land,” yet the environs of
the imperial capital at St. Petersburg did little to prepare a student for the deserts of the
south.54 On recalling his first trip to Turkestan in 1910, Rizenkampf remembered thinking
“that the reclamation engineer, landing in Turkestan from Europe, should immediately
lose his nerve: these endless deserts and steppes, oceans of sand, naked, treeless slopes of
the mountains […].”55 
25 Indeed,  though  it  may  be  argued  that  “water  shaped  the  engineering  profession  in
Russia”56—since Russia’s first generation of engineers had emerged in St. Petersburg to
deal  specifically with local  problems such as the flooding of  the Neva River—Russian
engineers were used to an abundance of water, not a lack thereof. St. Petersburg was a
city built on marshes, where water was a constant threat. In Central Asia, in contrast,
water was scarce, trapped in high mountain glaciers, large saline lakes, or slow‑moving
rivers that dwindled into nothing in the steppes and deserts. Moving from wet, northern
environments to the almost diametrically opposed environments of the south posed great
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challenges  to  Russia’s  newly  trained  hydraulic  engineers.  Even  Russia’s  experiences
importing new techniques for reshaping land use and agricultural  production on the
steppes were not adequate preparation for transforming the arid lands of Central Asia.57
26 Nor did engineers’ travels in Europe necessarily prepare them for the sandy spaces of
Central  Asia.  While  European  and  Russian  engineers  had  long  experience  with  the
rectification of rivers, the draining of marshes, and the construction of dikes to hold back
the sea, irrigation engineering in an arid region produced a host of new problems. The
related problems of swamping and salinization, for instance, due to imperfect drainage
systems and the leaching of soluble salts up through the soils to the surface, plagued
Russian‑engineered irrigation systems and irrigated agriculture in Central Asia, leading
to a decline in soil fertility, as it had for British engineers in India and Egypt.58 Tsarist
officials were forced to recognize the difficult work of planning and overseeing irrigation
systems in arid regions in comparison with European Russia.59
27 The work of British engineers in India and Egypt was thus an obvious model for the
would‑be irrigators of Turkestan.60 Postcards in the Russian archives from Algeria and
Tunisia,  along with an article on the Sahara desert,  indicate that Skorniakov studied
North Africa as a case for water management in arid regions.61 But in the first decades of
the  twentieth  century  it  was  the  idea  of  creating  a  “Russian  California”  that  most
captivated enthusiasts for the transformation of Turkestan’s deserts.62 
28 California was symbolic of the entire arid region that spanned the western United States.
In  the 1890s,  in  a  climate of  progressivism and a  country wracked by droughts  and
economic depression, the United States federal government had begun to invest more
into irrigation.63 Already at that time, the Russian famine of 1891‑1892 had prompted
Russians to look to America for ideas on how to improve the steppe and desert lands of
the Russian Empire. In an 1892 article in Russkaia mysl´ on “Irrigation in the Western
United  States,”  Aleksandr  Voeikov  demonstrated  the  kinds  of  results  that  could  be
attained in Russia  through the introduction of  “artificial”  irrigation on an American
model.  In  1893  Count  Comodzinskii,  the  Russian  Empire’s  engineer‑in‑chief  and
inspector‑general  of  hydraulic  works,  attended  the  Second  International  Irrigation
Congress in Los Angeles.64 However, it was not until the Russian government began in the
twentieth century to realize the crucial role of irrigation in the development of Turkestan
that the United States became the focus of Russian attention in the field of hydraulic
engineering.
29 In  the  early  twentieth  century  the  western  United  States  became  an  important
destination for hydraulic specialists seeking a career in Turkestan. Between 1908 and
1910,  for  instance,  Skorniakov  made  such  a  journey.  At  the  Seventeenth  National
Irrigation Congress in Spokane, Washington in 1909, he expressed both his gratitude for
the courtesies shown him on his American travels, as well as his admiration for American
engagement with the “latest engineering methods.”65 He was particularly interested in
the hydraulic engineering and resettlement projects initiated under the Carey Act, which
introduced private capital to reclamation projects in arid areas of the West, a scheme he
believed “could be successfully transferred to Russia for aid in colonizing desert regions
of Turkestan and Siberia.”66
30 Engineer Vladimir V. Tsinzerling, who carried out important investigations in the 1910s
and 1920s of the irrigation potential of the Amu Daria, one of the primary arteries of
Central Asia, seems to have gained valuable hydraulic engineering experience by working
on the irrigation of California’s Imperial Valley.67 In 1912, Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture
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sent Pëtr P. von Weymarn, a 1906 graduate of the Institute of the Corps of Transport
Engineers, to spend two years in the United States and Canada studying dambuilding
methods, irrigation canal headworks, and the construction of reservoirs.68 Beginning in
January 1916, he would serve as Vasil´ev’s assistant on the project to irrigate Turkestan’s
Chu River Valley. 
 
Imperial mindsets
31 The similarities between the irrigation of Russian Turkestan and the American West went
deeper than scientific exchange, however. Environmental historian Donald Worster has
famously  argued  that  the  regulation  of  water  in  the  American  West  by  powerful
technocrats,  engineers,  and  large  land  owners  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  hydraulic
empire.69 Their visions of the most “rational” use of the scarce water resources of the
western United States drove development that favored some at the expense of others,
particularly those who lived on and worked that land. The development of some sites
over  others  was  often  an  entirely  political  decision,  rather  than  a  scientific  one.70
Proponents  for  irrigation  of  Turkestan, therefore,  had  more  than  just  a  scientific
language in common with proponents of irrigation in the American West; they, too, spoke
a language that expressed ideas about transformation and resource exploitation which
privileged one vision of  proper land use at  the expense of  others,  a  vision that  was
inherently political.
32 At the irrigation congress in Spokane in 1909, engineer Skorniakov talked about the ways
in which the climates and topographies of the United States and Russia were similar. “We
have  also  our  arid  regions  and  we  have  also  irrigation,”  he  said,  “and  we  need
reclamation  of  our  immense  area  of  the  most  fertile,  but  now  desert  lands.”71 His
statement reveals a common trope among engineers in both the United States and Russia:
the idea that “desert” was a condition, a temporary state that concealed a latent fertility
that could be restored through “reclamation.” Like their counterparts in the American
West,  who in the late nineteenth century began to speak more frequently about the
reclamation of “waste” land, Russian irrigators and tsarist officials alike also began to use
a similar language of improvement to invoke the redemption of lands that currently lay
uncultivated.72 In Russian, “arid” can be expressed in several ways, including bezvodnyi
(waterless) and besplodnyi (infertile, barren). Both of these descriptions suggest a kind of
land that is unfit for cultivation. Thus, while Russian irrigators did on occasion speak of
“arid” (i.e., waterless and barren desert lands), it was much more common to talk about
“dead” lands that could be brought to life through the process of ozhivlenie, the word
most  commonly  used  to  describe  the  process  of  “greening”  the  deserts.  Ozhivlenie
literally means to resuscitate or reanimate. Thus “dead” lands were not lands that were
infertile or sterile—rather, they were lands in which the potential for life existed. 
33 Ian Tyrrell has suggested that the language of reclamation “connoted something more
than restoration of natural abundance. Rather, it asserted human claims to primacy and
possession that fitted the theme of imperial domination of nature.”73 In the Russian case,
the language of ozhivlenie similarly suggested the important human role in the process of
bringing deserts to life.  This emphasis on human ability to give life to desert wastes
assigned a  special  power to  the hydraulic  engineer  who could set  such a  process  in
motion. In Russian, as in English, the word desert (pustyne) contains connotations of
emptiness—pustyne and pustoi (empty) share a common root. Deserts were not barren
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places where no life existed; they were empty places waiting for the “cultured hand of the
engineer” to fill them with life.74 The fact that they often were not empty at all was a fact
that was not always taken into consideration.
34 Indeed, imperial domination was not confined to domination of nature alone. Like their
counterparts  in  the  American  West,  Russian  engineers  in  Turkestan  also  “viewed
themselves as ‘missionaries of light and progress’ and pioneers of a ‘better and higher
degree of civilization.’”75 In Turkestan, traces of vast, ancient irrigation systems seemed
proof  of  both  a  more  glorious  past  as  well  as  the  region’s  future  potential.  As  a
well‑known nineteenth‑century Russian scholar of Central Asia remarked, in the area of
irrigation, “perhaps more so than in others, one feels the close linkage between the study
of the past of the region and the work being done for its future.”76 It was the notion of
formerly glorious hydraulic civilizations,  juxtaposed with a program of improvement,
which gave those who were interested in the hydraulic transformation of Central Asia a
sense of purpose. The implication was that if “culture” (agricultural settlement) did not
yet exist (or no longer existed) in the empty deserts, it was because the indigenous people
of the region did not possess a high enough degree of “civilization.” 
35 Diana Davis has suggested that French imperialists attempted to justify colonial rule in
the Maghreb by “resurrecting the granary of Rome” from centuries of nomadic neglect.77
Similarly, some Russian irrigators suggested that nomads were in part to blame for the
current  situation  in  Turkestan.  A  Russian  irrigation  technician  named  Matisen,  for
instance, wrote that “nomads, […] not knowing how to profit from the culture of the
farmers,  sometimes  wiped  […][agriculture]  out  completely,  destroying  the  results  of
many centuries of work by grain growers and merchants and transforming rich oases into
desert  […].  It  is  self  evident,”  he  went  on  to  write,  “that…the  new  construction  of
irrigation systems is not in the power of the indigenous population,” a statement clearly
meant to justify the intervention of the Russian imperial government.78 Another Russian
observer  noted coolly  that  the American government  had managed to deal  with the
problem of  nomadic  peoples  quite  simply,  by  means  of  the  creation  of  a  system of
reservations.79
36 Deciding which regions  to  transform through irrigation and whose visions  would be
realized in the transformation was always an inherently political process, driven by those
who could convince others that they had the knowledge and power to make such visions
reality. The similarities between Russian and American visions of making the rivers flow
and making the deserts bloom can help to explain the mutual enthusiasm on both sides
when,  in  December 1910,  American  entrepreneur  John  Hays  Hammond  wrote  to
Krivoshein that he wished to send experts to Turkestan, “[…] with the view of entering
into an arrangement […] for the reclamation of these districts.”80 Hammond’s vision of
turning “waste land” into productive land resonated thoroughly with Russian visions for
the transformation of Turkestan into a prosperous colony of the empire. The Department
of  Land Improvement  quickly  agreed to  Hammond’s  terms—in spite  of  the  fact  that
Hammond wished to investigate a sensitive border region—reserving the entire Qara Qum
desert region of Turkestan for investigation by his team, which consisted of American
engineers Arthur P. Davis and William Mackie. Davis was Head Engineer of the United
States Reclamation Service, the work of which was “the most important work of this kind
being undertaken anywhere in the world,” Hammond reminded the Russians.81 Mackie,
according to Hammond, was “considered the number one American authority on the
greening of arid lands.”82 
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37 The American irrigation engineers were enthusiastically received by Russian engineers
and officials in Turkestan.83 Davis, for his part, praised the work of Russian hydraulic
engineers in Turkestan like Ostrovskii.84 After several weeks of investigation in the Qara
Qum, however, Davis and Mackie concluded that, “the facts at hand are sufficient to show
that there is no possibility of working out a project here that would be profitable for
private capital.”85 When Hammond requested additional rights to investigate the Hungry
Steppe, Krivoshein refused. 
38 This episode has been interpreted as indicative of the Russian government’s reluctance to
involve  private  entrepreneurs  in  schemes  to  irrigate  Turkestan.86 However,  such  an
interpretation ignores the fact that official discussions about the importance of irrigation
for the development of Turkestan often stressed the importance of attracting private
capital. Moreover, the fact that Russian officials were so quick to approve Hammond’s
plans, privileging his petition over all other domestic and foreign requests, suggests that
American knowledge and experience, in the form of some of America’s best hydraulic
engineers, may have been as important as (or even more important than) the input of
American capital into the irrigation of Turkestan.87 American irrigation expertise was
what Hammond could offer that domestic and even other foreign entrepreneurs could
not.  Hammond,  moreover,  offered  the  expert  knowledge  and  experience  with  arid
regions which Russian engineers and administrators in Turkestan so greatly desired. For
Russian engineers, access to American knowledge would also address the uncomfortable
situation prevailing in Turkestan,  namely the fact  that  Russian engineers had hardly
expanded the amount of irrigated land in Turkestan. Russia may even have hoped to use
American  knowledge  to  beat  the  Americans  at  their  own  game  and  become  less
dependent on imports of American cotton.88 
39 So what can explain this seeming paradox? Why did Krivoshein leap to secure American
hydraulic engineering expertise to develop irrigation in Turkestan, only to then reject it?
The answer may lie with the second goal of irrigation in Turkestan: colonization. The call
by Russian technocrats to “use all of the water reserves of the krai [borderland province]
and create a ‘new’ cultured Turkestan” was both literal—a program of action to double
the amount of irrigated land—as well as politically symbolic—lands colonized by Russians
and planted with cotton to feed the empire’s textile mills would “act as a counterweight
to  the  old,  Muslim  Turkestan.”89 The  problem  was  that—as  Russian  officials  widely
recognized—Slavic settlers from the more northerly lying regions of the empire, unused
to irrigated agriculture and unfamiliar with the cotton plant, did not make good cotton
cultivators. For this reason, most of the expansion of cotton had taken place on the lands
of indigenous Turkestani smallholders in the Ferghana Valley. Moreover, unlike in the
steppe regions to the north, until 1910 there was no provision in the Turkestan Statute to
identify “excess” lands that were not in use by the nomadic populations of the region and
thus could be reserved for the tsarist state. This concern was repeatedly raised during
discussions of the expansion of irrigation for cotton and colonization.90 Lastly, the area of
colonization was one in which the central government desired to have more control; even
overenthusiastic regional officials were chastised for trying to interfere in this process.91
40 There was, therefore, an inherent tension in the dual goals of irrigation in Turkestan.
Large,  relatively  unpopulated  areas  such  as  the  Hungry  Steppe  that  were  slated  for
development for Russian settlement could only grow small amounts of cotton. Regions
such as the Merv oasis or Qara Qum desert could be developed for cotton, but the farmers
would have to be indigenous Turkestanis,  at  least  until  Russians learned more about
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cotton. And while the Russian government was willing to grant concessions to private
(even foreign) entrepreneurs who wished to make the deserts of Turkestan bloom with
cotton, it was difficult to imagine major concessions of government land in regions that
were to be colonized.92 Krivoshein was quite willing to grant Hammond’s team priority in
the deserts—and he encouraged the team to investigate other regions as well—but he
could  not  grant  them concessions  in  the  Hungry  Steppe;  after  much discussion,  the
steppe  had been  marked  as  an  important  region  for  Orthodox  Russian  settlers,  an
important step in the fulfillment of Russian visions of a “new” Turkestan. Even American
expertise could not trump the political significance of colonization. 
41 As Ian Tyrrell has pointed out, “irrigation is not [only] about drains, pumps, pipes, and
dams,  but  [also]  about  dreams.”93 Russian  hydraulic  engineers  and  technocrats  alike
shared  their  visions  of  filling  “empty”  deserts  with  life  and  bringing  “culture”  to
wastelands with imperialists around the world, including, most significantly, the creators
of the hydraulic empire taking shape in the arid American west. Politics, however, were
both  an  empowering  and  a  limiting  factor.  While  Russian  hydraulic  engineers  were
suitable agents of the tsarist “civilizing mission” in the Central Asian borderlands, they
were also hampered by the tsarist state’s impotence in the region, particularly when it
came to the legal  right to use the region’s  most precious resources,  land and water.
Though they and other specialists were willing to serve the state by carrying out the
scientific studies necessary to clarify the existing patterns of water and land usage and
rectify this situation, and though the invitation of Hammond to Turkestan shows that the
tsarist government was not above harnessing foreign capital for such investigations, the
real problem was time. Though a draft of a water law for Turkestan was finally drawn up
in 1916, it was too little, too late. A massive uprising in the region that year signified the
beginning of the end for the Russian Empire in Turkestan; a year later, the empire was no
more. Though the Bolshevik regime that replaced the tsarist government was in many
ways ideologically foreign to irrigation engineers in Turkestan, it embraced visions of a
physical transformation of Turkestan’s deserts with a new vigor. Small wonder, then, that
many of Turkestan’s hydraulic engineers,  like Rizenkampf,  welcomed this new era in
which, having learned “to love the East in its past and to think about its future,” they
might more fully invest their “creative energy [and] physical strength […] in order to
awaken  Turkestan  and  bring  the  region  to  the  tempo  of  European  life.”94 When
Rizenkampf wrote these words in 1921, one phase of imperial engineering in Turkestan
had ended, but another era had just begun.
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ABSTRACTS
This essay examines hydraulic engineers in Central Asia under tsarist rule and their participation
in  processes  of  agricultural  expansion  and  empire-building  in  the  imperial  province  of
Turkestan.  This  province  theoretically  provided  the  perfect  space  in  which  Russians,  who
continually worried about their own “backwardness” in relation to Europe, could demonstrate
their  ability  to  be  a  colonial  power  on  par  with  European  empires,  yet  the  lack  of  an
understanding of irrigation engineering and the difficulties of irrigating arid regions threatened
to jeopardize Russia’s efforts at a “civilizing mission.” Still, a growing group of Russian technical
specialists  was able  to  participate  in  scientific  dialogue  and  transnational  technological
exchanges  with  other  hydraulic  engineers  in  other  parts  of  the  world  who  were  similarly
enthusiastic about the potential of science and technology to create a more modern future in the
Russian Central Asian borderlands. Ultimately, however, even though the zeal of these Russian
and  foreign  hydraulic  experts  coincided  with  Russian  political  ambitions  in  Turkestan,  the
political realities of the tsarist government’s position in the region would determine the fate of
their grand visions for transformation.
Cet  article  étudie  la  participation des  ingénieurs  en hydraulique en Asie  centrale  à  l’époque
impériale  dans  les  processus  d’expansion  agricole  et  de  renforcement  de  l’empire  dans  la
province du Turkestan. A priori, cette province rassemblait tous les critères pour que les Russes,
qui déploraient constamment leur « retard » vis-à-vis de l’Europe, puissent y faire la preuve de
leur capacité à être un pouvoir colonial au même titre que les empires européens,  mais leur
méconnaissance  de  l’ingénierie  en  irrigation  et  les  difficultés  à  irriguer  des  régions  arides
menaçaient de compromettre les efforts de la Russie dans sa « mission civilisatrice ». Pourtant,
on  comptait  toujours  davantage  de  techniciens  russes  capables  de  participer  au  dialogue
scientifique et aux échanges technologiques transnationaux avec les ingénieurs en hydraulique
étrangers, eux-mêmes tout aussi enthousiastes sur le potentiel de la science et de la technologie à
créer un avenir plus moderne en Asie centrale russe. Finalement, cependant, même si le zèle de
ces Russes et des experts hydrauliques étrangers coïncidait avec les ambitions politiques russes
au Turkestan,  les  réalités  politiques de la  position du gouvernement impérial  dans la  région
déterminèrent le destin de leurs grandes visions transformatrices.
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